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AN ACCOUNTING OF PROFITS FOR TRADE-SYMBOL'
INFRINGEMENT BASED UPON A THEORY
OF RESTITUTION
INTRODUCTION
In their most recent efforts to protect the trade-symbol owner from
the activities of the trade pirate, equity courts have turned to awards
based upon an accounting of the infringer's profits.2 These recent
cases represent a retreat from former limitations placed upon this
1. For purposes of this note "Trade-symbol" includes technical and non-
technical trade-marks registered on the "Principal Register," 60 Stat. 428 (1946),
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1958); trade-names registered on the "Supplemental Register,"
60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1958) and common law trade-marks and
trade-names.
A technical trade-mark is one which, at common law, may be immediately
appropriated to the use of an individual and is registrable under trade-mark
statutes. 37 TRADEMARK REP. 5 (1948). To meet the requirements of immediate
registration on the "Principal Register" a mark must be fanciful, unique, arbi-
trary, distinctive and non-descriptive. De Walt, Inc. v. Magna Power Tool Corp.,
289 F.2d 656 (C.C.P.A. 1961); Judson Dunaway Corp. v. Hygiene Products Co.,
178 F.2d 461 (lst Cir. 1949); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Ins. Co., 185 F.
Supp. 895 (E.D. Ark. 1960); 87 TRADEMARK REP. 5 (1948).
A non-technical mark is one failing some of the requirements of a technical
mark but which "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce" and
thus is registrable upon a showing of "exclusive and continuous use" for the five
years preceding application. 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1958).
Symbols registrable on the "Supplemental Register" include geographical and
descriptive marks or surnames "capable of distinguishing applicant's goods or
service and not registrable on the principal register." 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15
U.S.C. § 1091 (1958). Supplemental registration, however, is not prima facie evi-
dence of ownership nor constructive notice of claim. 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15
U.S.C. § 1091 (1958); 37 TRADEMARK REP. 10 (1948).
Common law trade-marks and trade-names find protection from infringement
under the unfair-competition doctrine of secondary meaning. Sargent & Co. v.
Welco Feed Mfg. Co., 195 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1952); Blisscraft of Hollywood v.
United Plastic Co., 189 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Skinner Mfg. Co. v.
General Food Sales, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 432 (D. Neb. 1943); 37 TRADEMARK REP. 5
(1948).
2. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastic Co., 294 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1961);
Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 251 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1958);
Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956) ;
Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1954); Century
Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1953); Dad's
Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverage, Inc., 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951); Feathercombs,
Inc. v. Solo Products Corp., 196 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Admiral Corp. v.
Price Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Ford Motor Co. v. Alltite
Motor Prod. Corp., 117 F. Supp. 460 (N.D. Fla. 1954); Lou Schneider, Inc. v.
Carl Gutman & Co., 69 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
specie of recovery,3 one of which, the requirement of direct competi-
tion4 between the infringer and trade-symbol5 owner, is the primary
concern of this discussion.6
3. The plaintiff was barred by laches. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. V. Arena
& Sons, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1939); Metz Labs., Inc. v. American Phar-
maceutical Co., 18 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). The defendant's gains were
disproportionate or trivial compared to the cost or expense of taking an account-
ing. O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v. Genuine Rubber Co., 287 Fed. 134 (1st Cir. 1923);
Kessler & Co. v. Goldstrom, 177 Fed. 392 (8th Cir. 1910); Kessler & Co., v. Klein,
177 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1910); Hennessy v. Wine Growers Ass'n, 212 Fed. 308 (S.D.
N.Y. (1914); Keystone Type v. Portland Pub. Co., 180 Fed. 301 (C.C. Me. 1910).
The fault was traceable to both parties. American Crayon Co. v. Prang Co., 38 F.2d
448 (3d Cir. 1930); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Ogilvie, 170 Fed. 167 (1st Cir. 1909);
Lewis Mach. Co. v. Columbia Mach. Corp., 22 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1937);
O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v. Genuine Rubber Co., 281 Fed. 851 (D. Mass. 1922). An
injunction satisfied the equities of the ease. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders,
331 U.S. 125 (1947); Triangle Pub., Inc. v. Hanson, 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947);
American Thread Co. v. North American Thread Co., 33 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y.
1935).
4. Roth, Inc. v. Hanson, 186 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921
(1951); Triangle Pub., Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948); Durable Toy
Corp. v. J. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Horlick's Malted Milk Corp.
v. Horluck's, Inc., 59 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1932); Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co.,
300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924); Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed.
407 (2d Cir. 1917); National Dryer Mfg. Corp. v. National Drying Mach. Co., 136
F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1955); Lorraine Mfg. Co. v. Lorraine Mfg. Co., 101 F.
Supp. 967 (D.N.J. 1952); Stardust, Inc., v. Weiss, 79 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1948); Acme Chem. Co. v. Dobkin, 68 F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Pa. 1946); Esquire, Inc.
v. Esquire Bar, 37 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1941); Famous Funnies, Inc. v. Famous
Funn Family, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Plough, Inc. v. Inter-
city Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Pa. 1939); see Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F.
Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955). See also Morgenstern Chem. Co. v. G. D. Searle &
Co., 253 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1958); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 747 (b) (i), comment g
(1938). Actual or direct competition has been defined as litigants soliciting "the
same trade from the same customers in the same territory at the same time."
Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917); 52 AM. JuR.
Trade-marks § 94, at 574 (1944); 148 A.L.R. 16 (1944).
5. Trade-mark law is only one aspect of the more extensive law of unfair com-
petition. American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 (1926); Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1915); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co., v.
Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 655 (1901); Chester Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester
Lourie, Ltd., 189 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); HoPKINS, TRADEmARKS, TRADE-
NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22 (4th ed. 1924). The broader doctrine affords
protection from fraudulent competition in all its forms. The basis of the law of
unfair competition is the preservation of the plane of competition. Ibid. This
preservation is intended to insure the health of the competitive process the law
deems essential to societal welfare.
Trade-mark law is that segment of the law of unfair competition dedicated to
the protection of source identification value of one's commercial word, mark or
device from infringement by another's use of a symbol in such a manner as to
engender public confusion. Hostetter v. Fries, 17 Fed. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). See
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This note suggests a restitution rationale under which the results
of recent cases with their extended trade-symbol protection might be
fitted within the existing trade-symbol protection construct.7
Essentially there are two possibilities for rationalizing money
recovery in trade-symbol infringement cases. In one instance the
public policy of protection of source identification is served by indem-
nifying the trade-symbol owner against damage resulting from palm-
ing off., This encompasses not only the more familiar fact situation
in which the trade-symbol owner suffers direct loss of sales due to
competitive activity aided by the pirated symbol,9 but also the
also Humphrey's Specific Homeopathic Medicine Co. v. Wenz, 14 Fed. 250 (D.N.J.
1882). Public insulation from fraud and customer confusion is a necessary inci-
dent of prohibiting the passing off or attempted passing off of goods and products
of one person for those of another and a principal rationale of protection. See
Standard Oil Co. v. Michie, 34 F.2d 802 (E.D. Mo. 1929); 1 NiMs, UNFAiR COM-
METITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 4 (4th ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as NIMs]. In
this respect trade-mark law affords public as well as private protection. See
1 NIMs § 7.
6. The scope of this note is limited to consideration of federal trade-symbol law.
It deals primarily with cases under the legislation of 1905, 1920 and 1946.
The first federal Trade-mark Act was passed in 1870, but was held unconstitu-
tional as a regulation on intrastate commerce. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82
(1879).
7. The Lanham Act secures federal jurisdiction and provides a trade-symbol
registration system with concomitant procedural advantages for the vindica-
tion of common law rights. Leadway Stores v. Hawkins, 33 TRADEMARK REP. 362
(1943) ; Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1943) ; National
Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinnel-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942); May v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 10 F. Supp. 249 (D. Mass. 1935); 2 NIMs, § 223a.
This does not mean that unregistered marks are not protected under federal law.
Infringement by unfair competition can be redressed in federal courts. Hum v.
Ousler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); Beech-Nut Packing v. Lorilard Co., 273 U.S. 629
(1927); Hanover Star Milling Co., v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1915); Standard
Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446 (1911); Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Sklar, 75 F. Supp. 98 (E.D.Pa. 1947). Patents, Copyrights, Trade-marks
and unfair Competition, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1958) provides:
(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights and trade-
marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in
patent and copyright cases.(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial
claim under the copyright, patent or trade-mark laws. June 25, 1948, c. 646,
62 Stat. 931.
See Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1942)
(majority and dissenting opinions).
8. Hygienic Specialties Co. v. Salzman, 302 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1962); Mershon
v. Pachmayr, 220 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1955); Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline
Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
9. Accounting of profits where direct competition is present: Mishawaka
Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942); Hamilton-
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instance in which there is dilution of the source-identification value
of the symbol as a result of its use in connection with non-competing
products or services of inferior quality which the relevant public
mistakenly ascribes to the rightful trade-symbol owner.10 The other
possibility for justification is a restitution rationale based not on
indemnification but on the right of the owner of property to be the
sole beneficiary of profits derived from its use.11 Of course undergird-
ing both theories of recovery is their value as deterrents to what the
law regards as socially undesirable conduct.12
I. BILL IN EQUITY FOR AN ACCOUNTING
Courts of equity may award an accounting of a trade-symbol in-
fringer's profits in addition to an injunction.13 A bill for an accounting
is historically traceable to the common law action of "acount" or
"account render. '14 Persons under a legal duty to account for money
or property in their custody were required to state such accounts
Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916); Wolf v. National Lead
Co., 272 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959); Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi Cola Labs., Inc., 155
F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1946); G. & C. Merriam v. Saalfield, 198 F.2d 369 (6th Cir.
1912); John J. Woodbury, Inc. v. William A. Woodbury Corp., 23 F. Supp. 162
(S.D.N.Y. 1938); Wrigley Co. v. Larson Co., 5 F.2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 1925). See also
Ford Motor Co. v. Alltite Motor Prod. Corp., 117 F. Supp. 460 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
Accounting of profits in absence of direct competition: Maternally Yours, Inc.
v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1955); Blue Bell Co. v. Fron-
tier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1954); Century Distilling Co. v. Con-
tinental Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1953); Dad's Root Beer Co. v.
Doe's Beverage, Inc., 193 (F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951); Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum
Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Lou Schnieder, Inc. v. Carl
Gutnan & Co., 69 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
10. Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1957);
Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic Brush Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co. 165 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1948);
Bristol-Meyers Co. v. R. H. Macy Co., 151 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ; Fancee
Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free Fashions, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Q-tips, Inc. v. Johnson and Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845 (D.N.J. 1952); Bulova
Watch v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947).
11. See notes 38-41 infra and accompanying text.
12. Walter Baker Co. v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514 (7th Cir. 1904) (damages);
HOPKINS, TRADEMARKS § 157 (1905). See also Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v.
Wolf Bros. Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916); Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136
(1888); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F.2d 708 (1941);
Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (2d Cir. 1896).
Wrigley Co. v. Larson Co., 5 F.2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 1925) (accounting). See also
HOPKINS, TRADEMARKS § 153 (1905).
13. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203
(1942); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916). An
accounting may be denied because an injunction adequately protects the plain-
tiff's rights. 2 NIms § 424.
14. 2 NIMS § 424; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 136 (1937).
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and to pay any balance due.15 The complicated nature of the issue,
and the fiduciary character assigned to the relation between the
trade-symbol owner and the trade-symbol infringer as a result of the
property right held to inure in a properly employed trade-symbol,
enabled equity to acquire jurisdiction at an early date.16 The con-
temporary action holds one who palms off his product as that of
another through infringing use of a trade-symbol liable for profits
realized from or attributable to the unlawful use of the symbol.' 7 The
benefit enjoyed by a trade-symbol infringer is increased profits which
are the result of a free ride on the trade-symbol owner's reputation
and good will. The decree places the infringer under a duty to account
for the value of the benefit derived from the infringement 8
II. THE DAMAGE-PROFIT DISTINCTION'
Since the theories underlying awards of damages and accountings
of profits are different, it follows that both might be available in a
given case. 2 Importation of criteria relevant to one measure of re-
covery into the other will result in confusion.21 Just such confusion
15. Ibid.
16. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1421 (5th ed. 1941). Section 1117 of
the Lanham Act envisions such an equitable accounting.
17. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 100 Me. 461, 62 Atl. 499 (1905).
See also 52 AM. JuR. TRADE MARKS § 147 (1944).
18. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 136 (1937).
19. Introducing the topic of profits and damages, Professor Nims, in his work,
Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks, quotes from Browne on The Law of Trade-
Marks § 517 (2d ed. 1888):
One who reads the decisions on the subject to which this chapter is de-
voted is tempted, as was Mr. Browne, when he wrote on the same problem...
to "relapse into uncertainty and despair of finding any nicely adjusted
scheme to solve the problem." 2 NIMS § 419.
20. English courts seem to deny recovery of both damages and profits requir-
ing the plaintiff to elect between the two. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros.
Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1915); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America,
116 F.2d 708, 716 (7th Cir. 1941). While American law courts cannot issue
injunctions, American courts of equity assess and collect damages along with
the issuance of injunctive relief. Nims, Damages and Accounting Procedure in
Unfair Competition Cases, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 431, 433 (1946). "In this country, it
is generally held that in a proper case both damages and profits may be awarded."
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1915).
21. A trade-symbol infringer's profits and a trade-symbol owner's damages
are two entirely separate and distinct items of recovery. Either or both might
be available in a given case. See authorities cited note 20 supra; Aladdin Mfg.
Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941); Lawrence-
Williams Co. v. Gombault, 52 F.2d 774 (6th Cir. 1931); M. B. Fahey Tobacco Co.
v. Senior, 252 Fed. 579 (3d Cir. 1918); Supreme Wine Co. v. American Distll-
ing Co., 203 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). An examination of the language of
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has resulted as most courts have based accounting recoveries upon a
mixture of tort and restitution theory.22 A direct competition require-
ment, obviously relevant to the recovery of one type of damages23
the Lanham Act makes this proposition clear. Section 35 of that statute expressly
distinguishes the defendant's profits from any damages incurred by the trade-
symbol owner:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in
the Patent Office shall have been established in any civil action arising under
this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . subject to the principles of
equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the
plaintiff, .... The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the
same to be assessed under its direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff
shall be required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all
elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing damages the court may
enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum
above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such
amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on
profits is either inadequate or excessive, the court may in its discretion
enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according
to the circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above circum-
stances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty. 60 Stat. 439 (1946),
15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1946). (Emphasis added.)
See RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 747 (1938); Pastificio Spica Societa v. De Martini
Macaroni Co., 200 F.2d 325 (1952).
A similar distinction is apparent in the Trade-Mark Act of 1905. "Upon a
decree being rendered in any case for wrongful use of a trade-mark the com-
plainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted for
by the defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained thereby . . ."
§ 19, 33 Stat. 729 (1905). (Emphasis added.) Apparently two different types
of liability may be incurred by the trade-symbol infringer, each emanating from
different obligations; first, an obligation to indemnify the trade-symbol owner
for injury actually inflicted, and, second, a duty to restore that which has been
wrongfully gained. See Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116
F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941). Profits are gains derived by a trade-symbol infringer
from the unfair use of another's trade-symbol as a consequence of a misrepre-
sentation of his goods as those of the other. Nims, Damages and Accounting
Procedure in Unfair Competition Cases, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 431, 434 (1946). Dam-
ages are gains the trade-symbol owner might have derived but for the wrongful
acts of the trade-symbol infringer. Winifred Warren, Inc. v. Turner's Gowns Ltd.,
285 N.Y. 62, 32 N.E.2d 793 (1941). An award based on damages may produce one
amount while recovery based on profits quite another, especially where the trade-
symbol infringer's profits exceed any damages the plaintiff is able to prove. The
difference in the theories lies in the bases upon which each is founded. Damages
lost upon a tort theory embracing notions of both indemnification and punishment:
Baker v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514, 520 (7th Cir. 1904) ; Hopiws, TRADFMAIKS, TmrAE-
NAMES & UNFAM COMFPETITION § 184 (4th ed. 1924); see Tilghman v. Proctor,
125 U.S. 136 (1888); Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (2d Cir. 1896);
Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941).
An accounting of profits, however, having emerged early as an equitable remedy,
resembles restitutionary recovery emphasizing the unjust enrichment of the
wrongdoer. Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136 (1888); Wrigley Co. v. Larson Co.,
5 F.2d 731, 739 (1925); HOPKINS, TRADEMiARKS, TRADENAIES & UNFAIR Co IP,-
TrION § 192 (4th ed. 1924).
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because of the necessity to show actual sales loss, 24 has been imposed
upon recovery by accounting despite its restitution basis.2 5
III. EVILS OF THE DIRECT COMPETITION REQUIREMENT
Source identification and thus conveyance of good will is that which
imparts property value to a trade-symbol.20 This value is at times
an elusive concept and has been variously defined. Some have viewed
Professor Nims, in his work, Unfair Competition and T'ademarks, recognizes
this distinction:
An accounting of defendant's profits may be ordered regardless of
whether plaintiff proves that he has suffered any loss because such an
accounting is based, not on plaintiff's loss, but on defendant's wrongdoing in
that he has used defendant's [sic] property for his own benefit, wrongfully.
"In contemplation of law such profits are diverted from the plaintiff, being
obtained through the improper invasion of plaintiff's trade rights. Entirely
apart from the question of actual damage the owner of a trade-mark is
entitled to recover from the infringer the profits realized by the latter from
the sales under the simulated trade-mark." 2 NIMs § 424.
22. Ibid.
23. (damages by actual sales loss) Fuller Products Co. v. Fuller Brush Co.,
299 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1962); Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411
(3d Cir. 1961); Admiral Corp. v. Admiral Employment Bureau, 151 F. Supp. 629
(E.D. Ill. 1957); see note 21 supra.
24. See cases cited note 23 supra; Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of
America, 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941).
25. Hygienic Prod. Co. v. Judson Dunaway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 935 (D.N.H.
1948); Acme Chem. Co. v. Dobkin, 68 F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Pa. 1946). See
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 747(b) (i) (1938) which requires the goods to be "of a
kind which compete with those marketed by the other" and a tortious state of
mind before awarding profits. But see RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 136 (1937)
which distinguishes a tort action and a cause for restitution. Comment a states:
Comment:
a. Persons who tortiously use trade names, trade secrets, water rights,
and other similar interests of others, are ordinarily liable in an action of tort
for the harm which they have done. In some cases, however, no harm is
done and in these cases if the sole remedy were by an action of tort the
wrongdoer would be allowed to profit at little or no expense. In cases where
the damage is more extensive, proof as to its extent may be so difficult that
justice can be accomplished only by requiring payment of the amount of
profits. Where definite damage is caused and is susceptible of proof, the
injured person, as in other tort cases, can elect between an action for
damages and an action for the value of that which was improperly received.
The usual method of seeking restitution is by a bill in equity, with a request
for an accounting for any profits which have been received, but the exis-
tence of a right to bring such a bill does not necessarily prevent an action at
law for the value of the use.
There is no requirement that the goods be competing though a tortious state
of mind seems to be necessary. Section 136 states: "A person who has tortiously
used a trade name, trade secret, franchise, profit a prendre, or other similar
interest of another is under a duty of restitution for the value of the benefit
thereby received."
26. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183
(1936); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877); Bond Stores, Inc. v. Bond
Stores, Inc., 104 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1939); Sawilowsky v. Brown, 288 Fed. 533
(5th Cir. 1923); Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber Works of Amer-
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it as "that which makes tomorrow's business more than an acci-
dent.., the reasonable expectation of future patronage based on past
satisfactory dealings.1127 Others have referred to it as merely another
name for reputation, credit, honesty, fair name and reliability.28 A
trade-symbol is one of the visible manifestations by which source is
made known to the public. 29 Judge Learned Hand has said that the
good will which source identification conveys is "like a face, . . . the
symbol of its possessor."20 It has long been recognized that the legal
basis for trade-symbol protection is to prevent the wrongful appro-
priation of this valuable asset. However, the direct competition re-
quirement serves to frustrate and inhibit the full accomplishment of
that policy.31 Injunctive relief,3 2 while available,3 3 does not meet the
exigency created by an accomplished infringement. For while it
affords a satisfactory safeguard in futuro, it is impotent with respect
to profits wrongfully derived prior to its issuance. Therefore the
trade-symbol owner is left with legal tools insufficient to protect his
interest and sustain the concomitant public policy interest.
The likelihood of an owner proving substantial damages is remote,
ica, Inc., 257 Fed. 937 (2d Cir. 1919); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Houston Ice
& Brewing Co., 241 Fed. 817 (5th Cir. 1917), aff'd, 250 U.S. 28 (1919); Land
O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowac Canning Co., 199 F. Supp. 124 (E.D.
Wis. 1961); Metropolitan Nat'l Bank v. St. Louis Post Dispatch Co., 36 Fed. 722
(E.D. Mo. 1888), aff'd, 149 U.S. 436 (1893); Howard v. Taylor, 90 Ala. 241, 8 So.
36 (1890); Bank of Tomah v. Warren, 94 Wis. 151, 68 N.W. 549 (1896).
27. Nealon, What is Good Will, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 730 (1957).
28. 1 Nims § 73. Mr. Justice Story defined good will as:
[T]he advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond
the mere value of the capital stock, funds, or property employed therein,
in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement which
it receives from constant or habitual customers on account of its local posi-
tion, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality,
or from other accidental circumstances, or necessities, or even from ancient
partialities, or prejudices. STORY, PARTNERSHIP 170 (6th ed. 1868).
29. HOPKINS, TRADEIALRKS, TRADENAMES & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3 (4th ed.
1924).
30. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (1928).
31. See note 4 supra.
32. See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877) and Simmons Co. v. Baker,
200 F. Supp. 149 (D. Mass. 1961) on scope of injunctions. See also 2 NIms § 367
for general considerations of final injunctions. "In formulating a final injunction
in trade-mark and unfair competition cases, the object of the court is to stop
confusion and to eliminate unfair dealing." Ibid.
33. North Am. Aircoach Sys., Inc. v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 231 F.2d 205
(9th Cir. 1955); Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 191 F.2d 141
(9th Cir. 1951); Bond Stores, Inc. v. Bond Stores, Inc., 104 F.2d 124 (3d Cir.
1939); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budweiser Malt Prod. Corp., 295 Fed. 306 (2d
Cir. 1923); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Allstates Trailer Rental, Inc., 188 F. Supp.
170 (D. Md. 1960); Lorraine Mfg. Co. v. Lorraine Knitwear Co., 88 F. Supp.
634 (N.D. Ga. 1949).
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as it is often impossible to show the extent to which an infringing
mark injures good will. Today's products are commonly distributed
and sold over vast areas and the effect of infringement on the public
is often unascertainable. 8' "The trade pirate oftent understands, to
some degree at least, the difficulties of showing damages and knows
he can use unfair methods with comparative safety. .. ."35 When no
harm is shown and "if the sole remedy were by an action in tort the
wrongdoer would be allowed to profit at little or no expense."38 In the
face of such distress, the public policy which demands that the trade-
symbol infringer not be permitted to profit by his own wrong37 goes
unvindicated and this trade practice is undeterred. 8
IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTION-A TRUE RESTITUTION RATIONALE
Rehabilitation of the restitution rationale is a solution to the pres-
ent confused state of the law and provides a legal theory upon which
an award of profits logically could be founded in the absence of direct
competition. Basing an accounting upon principles analogous to those
charging a trustee with profits acquired by the wrongful use of the
property of a cestui que trust, the restitution rationale holds a trade-
symbol infringer accountable to its owner for those profits derived
from the infringement by which he has been unjustly enriched.
Early cases were reluctant to allow restitutionary recovery for the
taking of intangibles.39 Courts seemed to have been misled by the
intangible character of the thing taken; and where the taking con-
sisted of a wrongful use of another's property and the use had not
been exclusive of the owner's use, or the property would not have
been used by its owner in any event, liability was generally denied. 0
The modern view, however, recognizes an "exclusive use" belonging to
the owner of an intangible"' and generally supports recovery.
34. Nesne v. Sundet, 93 Minn. 299, 101 N.W. 490 (1946).
It may have been practical in the past for a plaintiff to prove the sales he
has lost by reason of defendant's acts. Today it is often impossible to find out
the actual effect on the public of unfair acts in the sale of goods, especially
where the article is sold for a small price, or bought casually, or the sales
are distributed over a wide area. Nins, Damages and Accounting Procedure in
Unfair Competition Cases, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 431, 432 (1946).
35. Nims, supra note 34.
36. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 136, comment a (1937).
37. Nims, supra note 34.
38. See note 21 supra and accompanying text on damage-profit distinction.
Nims, supra note 34.
39. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894); Phillips v. Homfray,
[1883] 24 Ch. D. 439; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 275 (1913).
40. Ibid.
41. See notes 2 & 9 supra.
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V. BASIS FOR THE RESTITUTION RATIONALE IN PRE-LANHAM
ACT CASE LAW
Pre-Lanham Act decisions characteristically based an accounting
for profits on a mixture of the tort and restitution theories.42 The
damage-profit distinction apparently was unrecognized in many
courts.4 3 The requirement of direct competition between the parties
became an established requisite for the recovery of an infringer's
profit.44 Despite this prevailing doctrine, however, judicial concepts
found expression from which a purely restitutionary theory of ac-
counting could be derived.
Language of the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros.45 is illustrative. The plaintiff
engaged in the manufacture of women's shoes, prayed for an injunc-
tion to restrain infringement of his trade-mark, The American Girl,
by defendant's use of the term American Lady, and for an accounting
of the defendant's profits. Speaking through Mr. Justice Pitney, the
Court affirmed a verdict for plaintiff and thoroughly considered the
nature of an accounting:
The right to use a trade-mark is recognized as a kind of property,
of which the owner is entitled to the exclusive enjoyment to the
extent that it has been actually used. . . . The infringer is re-
quired in equity to account for and yield up his gains to the true
owner, upon a principle analogous to that which charges a trustee
with the profits acquired by wrongful use of the property of the
cestui que trust. Not the equity assumes jurisdiction upon the
ground that a trust exists ... the jurisdiction must be rested upon
some other equitable ground-in ordinary cases, as in the pres-
ent, the right to an injunction-but the court of equity, having
acquired jurisdiction upon such a ground, retains it for the pur-
pose of administering complete relief, rather than send the in-jured party to a court of law for his damages. And profits are
then allowed as an equitable measure of compensation, on the
theory of a trust ex maleficio.4r
42. See note 4 supra.. See Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. Congress Cigar Co., 118
F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1941); Golden West Brewing Co. v. Milonas & Sons, Inc., 104
F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1939); Bond Stores, Inc. v. Bond Stores, Inc., 104 F.2d 124
(3d Cir. 1939); Wisconsin Elec. Co. v. Dunmore Co., 35 F.2d 555 (6th Cir. 1929),
petition for cert. dismissed, 282 U.S. 813 (1931) ; Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson,
26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928); Rosenberg Bros. v. Elliott, 7 F.2d 962 (3d Cir.
1925); Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924), cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 706 (1926); Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed.
407 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918); Acme Chem. Co. v. Dobkin, 68
F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Pa. 1946); Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Bar, 37 F. Supp. 875
(S.D. Fla. 1941).
43. See Lawrence-Williams Co. v. Societe Enfants Gombault, 52 F.2d 774
(6th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 549 (1932).
44. See cases cited note 4 supra.
45. 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
46. Id. at 259; the Court at 261-62 quoted from the case of Graham v. Plate,
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Under the Hamilton-Brown doctrine, the infringer's profits may be
recovered even though the trade-symbol owner is incapable of proving
actual damages.4 7
The burden of proof problem was considered by the Supreme Court
in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co.48 The
plaintiff manufactured and sold shoes and rubber heels bearing a red
circular plug in the center of the heel. The defendant sold heels bear-
ing a circular reddish mark closely resembling that of the plaintiff.
A prayer for an injunction and an accounting of profits was sustained
although the plaintiff could offer no evidence of actual sales loss. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter stated:
The burden is the infringer's to prove that his infringement had
no cash value in sales made by him. If he does not do so, the
profits made on sales of goods bearing the infringing mark prop-
erly belong to the owner of the mark .... There may well be a
windfall to the trademark owner where it is impossible to isolate
the profits which are attributable to the use of the infriging
mark. But to hold otherwise would give the windfall to the
wrongdoer. In the absence of his proving the contrary, it pro-
motes honesty and comports with experience to assume that the
wrongdoer who makes profits from the sales of goods bearing
a mark belonging to another was enabled to do so because he was
drawing upon the good will generated by that mark.49
Despite these pronouncements the courts remained inconsistent both
as to results in accounting cases and the bases selected to rationalize
them.50 The pre-Lanham Act case law was chiefly significant for the
restitutionary flavor of some of its judicial language.5 1 The majority
of cases, however, before and after the Lanham Act, have held
tenaciously to the direct competition requirement.52
40 Cal. 593, 598-99 (1871) as follows: "If one wrongfully mixes his own goods
with those of another, so that they cannot be distinguished and separated, he
shall lose the whole, for the reason that the fault is his; and it is but just that
he should suffer the loss rather than an innocent party, who in no degree con-
tributed to the wrong." The theory upon which this passage is based was
analogized to the theory upon which an accounting of profits in trade-symbol in-
fringement cases should be based. See Anchor Stove & Range Co. v. Rymer, 97
F.2d 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 653 (1938); Garelella v. Log Cabin
Products Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937).
47. Ibid.
48. 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
49. Id. at 206-07.
50. See notes 4 & 21 supra.
51. Two pre-Lanham Act cases sanctioning injunctive relief in the absence
of direct competition upon an unjust enrichment theory: Bond Stores, Inc. v.
Bond Stores, Inc., 104 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1939); and Dodge v. East, 8 F.2d 872
(E.D.N.Y. 1925). "[F]ilching of a good name and obtaining an unearned bene-
fit." Bond Stores, Inc. v. Bond Stores, Inc., supra at 125.
52. See note 4 supra.
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However, as will be developed in detail below, there has been a line
of post-Lanham Act cases which have awarded an accounting of the
trade-symbol infringer's profits in the absence of direct competition."
Although this line of cases has sustained the accounting remedy ab-
sent direct competition, the underlying theory has been obscured, if
explicated at all.5 4 These decisions, however, indicate that some mod-
ern equity courts are simply unwilling to contribute to a gap in trade-
symbol law inviting palming-off with its resultant customer confu-
sion25
VI. BASIS FOR THE RESTITUTION RATIONALE IN POST-LANHAM
ACT CASE LAW
An example of this line of post-Lanham Act cases is Century
Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp." in which the Third
Circuit recognized an accounting absent direct competition but failed
to indicate the basis for its award. Continental distilled and sold a
quality gin under the registered mark Dixie Belle while defendant sold
a bourbon of lesser quality under the mark Dixie Due. Continental's
prayer for an injunction and the recovery of defendant's profits was
sustained. The court summarily ruled that even though the referee
made a subsequent finding that there existed direct geographical
competition, the trial court properly ordered the accounting of profits
without such evidence.5 7
In a similar case, Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop,
Inc.,8 the plaintiff was engaged in the retail merchandising of ma-
ternity apparel in the New York metropolitan area. Defendant,
Your Maternity Shop, opened its shops in New Rochelle, New York
and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The defendant contended that its
Philadelphia store should not be included in the accounting because
the plaintiff did not have a competing store in the Philadelphia area.
The trial judge's findings that defendant adopted its fradename with
knowledge of plaintiff's trade-mark, and that an infringer must ac-
53. Maternally Yours, Inc., v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir.
1956); Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1954);
Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doe's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Admiral
Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 796 (1956). See Century Distill-
ing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d 140 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 900 (1953); Lou Schnieder, Inc. v. Carl Gutman & Co., 69 F. Supp. 392
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
54. See Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp. and Admiral
Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, Inc., supra note 53.
55. See cases cited note 53 supra.
56. 205 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1953).
57. Id. at 144.
58. 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956).
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count for profits even in areas where he does not directly compete
with the trade-mark owner, were affirmed without comment.
Other courts abandoning the direct competition requirement have
been more articulate in stating a foundation upon which such action
might be based and lend support to a restitution grounded accounting.
Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc. 9 is illustrative. The
defendant, a franchised bottler of plaintiff's root beer, was charged
with trade-mark infringement and unfair competition for the appro-
priation of the plaintiff's corporate name, trade-mark, distinctive
label and bottle shape. It appeared from the evidence that there was
no direct competition between the parties in the New York City
consuming market and hence no provable loss of sales. The nearest
distribution points for the plaintiff's root beer were as distant as
Buffalo, New York, Newark, New Jersey and Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania. The Second Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that
in the absence of direct competition the plaintiff was not entitled to
an accounting of profits. The court stated: "As the district judge
pointed out, it is well settled in equity that a trademark infringer is
liable as trustee for profits accruing from his illegal acts, even though
the owner was not doing business in the consuming market where the
infringement occurred." 0 Considering the equitable nature of an
accounting the court continued: "[I]t is well settled that the court
'will endeavor to adapt its relief to the general equities of the particu-
lar situation, as nearly as it is possible to do so' in designing relief
for unfair competition."'
The Tenth Circuit, in Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 2
furnished added support to a restitution based accounting. Frontier
sought an injunction and accounting of profits for infringement and
unfair competition, when, upon a rescission of an exchange agreement,
Blue Bell continued to use Frontier's advertising and trade equipment
and distributed gasoline under the Frontier brand. The district court
found infringement and decreed injunctive relief submitting to an
advisory jury the task of computing defendant's profits in the states
of Idaho and Utah. Blue Bell appealed alleging that the measure of
recovery was not its profits, but Frontier's provable loss because there
was no direct competition in those two states. Blue Bell's contention
was rejected. Affirming the district court's holding, the appellate
court stated that the case was correctly sent to the jury on the ques-
tion of recoverable profits. Citing the Mishawaka case, the court bur-
dened Blue Bell with the onus of showing that the profits realized
59. 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951).
60. Id. at 82.
61. Id. at 83.
62. 213 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1954).
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were not attributable to the infringement. Dispensing with the direct
competition requirement the court indicated a restitution base for
its ruling:
Out of the welter of confusion occasioned by the judicial effort
to fashion a remedy which would satisfy both legal and equitable
concepts of appropriate relief for patent and trademark infringe-
ments,... [the] infringer is liable as a trustee for profits ...
even though the owner of the mark was not doing business in the
... market where the infringement occurred .... Recovery is
predicated upon the equitable principle of unjust enrichment, not
the legal theory of provable damages . 3
However, in both the Dad's Root Beer and the Blue Bell cases, the
two markets were in close geographical proximity though not close
enough to be technically direct. While the direct competition require-
ment was shelved, competition in some form was involved. The form
of competition envisioned would seem to have been based upon the
recognition that goods sold to dealers and to the public ultimately
become competitive, and concerns doing business in separate terri-
tories may be potential competitors.6 4
VII. ANOTHER IMPEDIMENT TO THE RESTITUTION RATIONALE-
DESCRIPTIVE PROPERTIES QUALIFICATION
The direct competition requirement has not been the sole obstacle
to a restitutionary recovery of a trade-symbol infringer's profits. The
potential scope of restitution based accounting has also been qualified
by requiring non-competing goods to be of the same descriptive
properties. 5 This requirement, though mandatory by the 1905
Trade-Mark Statute, does not appear in the Lanham Act. 0 Its intro-
duction into the cases may be explained by the strict construction
some courts has placed on the Lanham Act's "likelihood of confu-
sion" test.67 In Lou Schneider, Inc. v. Carl Gutman & Co.,", plaintiff
was the owner of the registered mark Hoot Lass Bonnie under which
it sold ladies' coats. Defendant manufactured women's sweaters,
skirts and blouses under the name Bonnie Lassie. An injunction was
63. Id. at 362-63.
64. 2 Nmis § 374, at 1195.
65. A case awarding profits in the absence of direct competition, but emphasiz-
ing the similarity of the non-competitive products: Admiral Corp. v. Price
Vacuum Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956); see Maternally Yours,
Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1955).
66. 1905 Trade-Mark Act § 16, 33 Stat. 724.
67. The Lanham Act protects the owner of a registered mark from the use
of another that is "likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers
as to the source of origin." 60 Stat. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1958).
68. 69 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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granted and accounting of profits ordered. The court, however,
stressed the fact that the non-competing goods contained similar
descriptive properties.
The "likelihood of confusion" test as expressed in section 1114(1)
of the Lanham Act states in part that the goods must be "likely to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of
origin of such goods or services. ' ' 69 This language does not require
that the products be of the same descriptive properties. It is not the
confusion of the goods which is crucial, but the confusion of source.70
The Lanham Act certainly comprehends goods which are unrelated
as well as those having a degree of similarity. "[G] oods, though dif-
ferent, may be so related as to fall within the mischief which equity
should prevent." 71 Strict adherence to a descriptive properties quali-
fication is unwarranted and inhibitive to a legitimate accounting of
profits based upon a restitution theory.72
A. Scienter
A trade-symbol infringer must act in a deliberate and intentional
fashion before an accounting of profits will be ordered.73 This scienter
requisite seems to have been firmly entrenched in the pre-Lanham
Act period, and there is rigid adherence to its dictates. Indeed the
presence of scienter seems to be a motivating factor of considerable
strength in the attitudes of most courts toward this problem.74
69. 60 Stat. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1958).
70. Time, Inc. v. Barshay, 27 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Vick Chem. Co. v.
Vick Medicine Co., 8 F.2d 49 (S.D. Ga. 1925), aff'd, 11 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1926);
1 NIMs § 221 h, at 692.
71. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407, 409-10 (2d Cir.
1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).
72. The term "related goods" has recently found more frequent use. See
Kotabs, Inc. v. Kotex Co., 50 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 665 (1931);
John F. Jelke Co. v. Eastern Baking Co., 29 F. Supp. 333 (D. Mass. 1939); 1
NIMs § 221 h, at 691.
73. National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 350
U.S. 883 (1955); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d
538 (2d Cir. 1956); Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354 (10th
Cir. 1954); Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doe's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.
1951); Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961),
aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962); Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago Pickle Co., 171
F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, 141 F.
Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956); see Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 205 F.2d 140 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 900 (1953); Lou Schneider,
Inc. v. Carl Gutman & Co., 69 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). This has been the
trend of decisions despite the fact that the Supreme Court had granted an ac-
counting against a non-willful infringer prior to the Lanham Act in Mishawaka
Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
74. This has been true of courts which have indicated a restitutionary theory
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France Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free Fashions, Ine.7 illustrates this
principle. The plaintiff sold women's intimate apparel under the
mark Fancee Free while defendant used Fancy Free Fashions on
women's lounging wear. The court held that there was infringement
and issued an injunction, but an accounting of the defendant's profits
was denied, in part76 due to the absence of the requisite intent.7
In Miles Lab., Inc. v. Frolich78 the plaintiff's prayer for injunctive
relief and an accounting was denied,7 9 the court holding that although
"intent to deceive the public is not a material element in an allegation
for trade-mark infringement . . . it is necessary to prove intent in
order to recover profits. . .. "80
as well as those which have not. See Fuller Products Co. v. Fuller Brush Co.,
299 F.2d 772 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962); Square D Co. v.
Sorensen, 224 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1955); Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. Congress Cigar
Co., 118 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1941); Golden West Brewing Co. v. Milonsa & Sons,
Inc., 104 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1939); Wisconsin Elec. Co. v. Dunmore Co., 35 F.2d
555 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 281 U.S. 710 (1929), dismissed, 282 U.S. 813 (1930);
Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago Pickle Co., 171 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Fancee
Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free Fashions, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
note 73 supra.
As for appellant's rights under the trade-mark acts, since this is not a
case where there has been "no showing of fraud or palming off," ... but
where the showing is quite to the contrary and the intentional misleading
has been demonstrated, appellant is entitled not merely to an injunction
as prayed for but to an accounting of appellees' profits .... National Lead
Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195, 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955).
See Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1954); Dad's
Root Beer Co. v. Doe's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77 (2d. Cir. 1951); Admiral Corp.
v. Price Vacuum Stores, 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
75. 148 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see Pastificio Spiga Societa v. De
Martini Macaroni Co., 200 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1952), allowing an accounting where
the plaintiff was precluded from same market by a fraudulent defendant.
76. There was no proof presented to the court that the defendant used its
mark "to deceive customers into buying" its merchanise nor was there sufficient
proof of pirated profits. Fancee Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free Fashions, Inc.,
148 F. Supp. 825, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
77. Accord, Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.
Cal. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962); Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago Pickle
Co., 171 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ill. 1959); but see Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your
Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1955) which would seem to illustrate
a de-emphasis of the fraud requirement. The appellate tribunal thought the
lower court had reached the right result in awarding profits, but that less
emphasis should have been placed on the subjective intent of the infringer.
Fraudulent intent was considered as merely one of many relevant factors in de-
termining likelihood of confusion.
78. 195 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd per cutiam, 296 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962); see A. Smith Bowman Distillery v.
Schenley Distillers, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 822 (D.C. Del. 1961).
79. The court initially found no infringement.
80. Miles Lab. Inc. v. Frolich, 195 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd per curtam,
296 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962).
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Fuller Products Co. v. Fuller Brush Co."1 directly held that where
"the acts of The Fuller Brush Company... have not been shown to
be wantonly and intentionally fraudulent" a trade-symbol owner is
not entitled to profits.2
An accounting of profits based upon a restitution rationale would
not eliminate the present requirement of proof of scienter. The
Restatement of Restitution requires a conscious taking for liability
for profits.83 On the other hand a restitution based recovery does
not ignore inadvertent infringement. Redress to the extent of the
market value of a trade-symbol would be available.8 4 Indeed an
inadvertent converter is placed by the Restatement under a duty to
pay the value of the subject of conversion. 5 Source identification, the
property right of a trade-symbol previously discussed, certainly is
capable of a market value assessment. Moreover the constructive
notice provision of the Lanham Act88 would seem to abolish any
defense based upon inadvertence in reference to registered marks.
81. 299 F.2d 772 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962).
82. Id. at 777.
83. "f. Profits and osse. A person who tortiously has acquired, retained or
disposed of another's property with knowledge that such conduct is wrongful is
entitled to no profits therefrom. He is... liable for profits made by its use...."
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 151, comment f (1937). "A person who has
tortiously used a tradename, trade secret, franchise, profit a prendre, or other
similar interest of another, is under a duty of restitution for the value of the
benefit thereby received." RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 136 (1937).
84. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 154, comment a (1937) ; "An innocent con-
verter ... despite his good faith... is under a duty to restore ... or... to
pay... value."
"Where a person is entitled to restitution from another because of an innocent
conversion, the measure of recovery for the benefit thus received is ... the value
of the property." RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 154 (1937).
85. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 154 (1937).
86. 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1958). This provision reads in part:
"Registration of a mark on the principal register provided by this chapter ...
shall be constructive notice of registrant's claim of ownership thereof." Quality
Courts United, Inc. v. Quality Courts, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Pa. 1956).
[I]t may be said that the principal advantages of registration are more
practical than legal, namely, the registration gives effectual constructive
notice to the public of the claim to the trade-mark and tends to give actual
notice, since the proposed trade-mark must be published in the Official
Gazette of the Patent Office. Also, the applicant for registration has the
benefit of the examination of his mark by the Patent Office before it is
registered and of the publication of it just mentioned, which tends to
invite opposition if there be any, and therefore, to aid the determination of
doubtful questions of validity.
Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Lab. Inc., 31 F. Supp 835, 842-43 (D.C. Md. 1940),
modified on other grounds, 117 F.2d 852 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 629
(1914).
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VIII. THE ADMIRAL CASES
Two recent cases have ostensibly reached opposite results though
arising out of the same fact pattern. These decisions have confused
the law and merit detailed consideration. Admiral Corp. v. Penco,
Inc.87 and Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores 88 arose from litiga-
tion precipitated by an action by Admiral for trade-mark infringe-
ment and unfair competition based upon the use by Price Stores of
the registered mark Admiral.
Admiral manuafctures and sells various electrical appliances, ex-
cept vacuum cleaners and sewing machines. Defendant Price Stores
sold electric vacuum cleaners and sewing machines under the Admiral
mark from retail outlets in the same geographical market.
Admiral's initial action was against Penco, a subsidiary of Price
Stores. The district court for western New York granted Admiral an
injunction restraining the distribution and sale of house-hold appli-
ances by the defendant under the plaintiff's mark. An accounting of
profits was denied. 9 Admiral filed a cross appeal alleging that its
right to an accounting had become mandatory under section 111790 of
the Lanham Act. The Second Circuit rejected this contention and
affirmed the lower court.
Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores"' was an action against the
defendant's remaining five subsidiaries. Judge Grim of the eastern
district of Pennsylvania granted an injunction and an accounting of
the defendant's profits.92
These two cases appear contradictory, Penco adhering to the direct
competition requirement and Price Stores rejecting it. The decisions,
however, are reconcilable. In the Penco case the plaintiff urged that
the right to an accounting had become mandatory under the Lanham
Act.9 3 The court said that the circuit had held otherwise in line with
what seemed to be the settled construction of the statute. The author-
ity of the Penco decision is limited to this principle. It cannot prop-
erly be interpreted as a holding on the proposition that an accounting
will be denied in the absence of direct competition. Moreover, the
Second Circuit in the previously discussed Dad's Root Beer" case,
sustained an accounting for non-competing goods in an opinion
rationalizing the holding in restitution terms. It does not appear that
87. 106 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D.N.Y.) 1952), aff'd, 203 F.2d 517 (2 Cir. 1953).
88. 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
89. Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D.N.Y. 1952).
90. 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1958).
91. 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
92. Letter from Caesar and Rivise, to author.
93. 203 F.2d 517, 521 (2d Cir. 1953).
94. Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doe's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951).
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the plaintiff asked for separation of the issues of infringement and
accounting. Thus Admiral's efforts in Penco were geared primarily
toward achieving injunctive relief, reserving a prayer for an account-
ing to be determined thereafter. The court indicated that this was
the strategy:
Plaintiff now says that the trial should have been in two stages,
referring to certain patent cases .... The trial judge undoubt-
edly might in his discretion separate the issues and try them as
convenient; but we know of no rule which would compel him to
do so, particularly without warning or request therefor from a
party.9 5
The Penco case did not reject or limit the restitution language
previously enunciated by the Second Circuit. Ostensibly that lan-
guage may still serve as a basis for an accounting in the absence of
direct competition. The Price Stores decision falls in line with such
post-Lanham Act cases as Century and Maternally Yours, which ig-
nored the direct competition requirement without justification.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with the diverse
handling by the circuits of these issues 6 since the passage of the
Lanham Act, the language of pre-Lanham Act pronouncements in the
Hamilton-Brown and Mishawaka cases indicates that a restitution
rationale will meet with favorable treatment by the high court when
the issue is presented.
Presently some courts have recognized that legal capabilities for
frustration of trade-symbol piracy are incomplete without the weapon
of accounting for profits as a measure of recovery. However, they
have been unsure in articulating the basis of their abandonment of
the traditional direct competition requirement for the accounting of
profits. Other courts still seem to cling to such a requirement regard-
less of its irrelevance with respect to the policy underlying restitu-
tion recovery.
A clarified restitution rationale has been suggested as a theory
capable of eliminating present deficiencies. An accounting is based
upon principles analogous to those charging a trustee with profits
acquired by wrongful use of the property of a cestui que trust. The
restitution rationale holds a trade-symbol infringer accountable to
the party he has wronged regardless of indemnity principles, for
95. Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F.2d 517, 521 (2d Cir. 1953); see
Alligator Co. v. Ciarochi, 141 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1956) where accounting was
denied because waived by the plaintiff.
96. See notes 2 & 4 supra.
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those profits derived from the infringement by which he has been un-
justly enriched.
Although an accounting of profits based upon an exclusively restitu-
tion theory has found only tentative expression in but a few decisions,
it must be recognized that judicial development and refinement of
legal theory is a slow process. The "principle of equity"9 spirit which
pervades the Lanham Act is in accord with this concept. The future
should see an expanded area of protection from trade-symbol infringe-
ment by an accounting of profits based upon a theory of restitution.
Pre-Lanham Act pronouncements and post-Lanham Act decisions
evince a legal basis for the restitution rationale. Other decisions
illustrate an inarticulate judicial temperament disinclined to allow
a trade-symbol pirate to profit from his wrongdoing.
97. "Subject to the principles of equity," 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §
1117 (1958).
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